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Abstract 
 
Iceland experienced a significant financial meltdown and subsequent economic 
downturn after the 2008/2009 financial crisis struck the country. It had been the 
worst crisis ever experienced by a small country from the late 20th century 
onwards. Since 1980s, Iceland's macroeconomic stability had been constantly 
deteriorated by the most volatile annual CPI and asset-price inflation dynamics in 
the OECD. More than a decade of robust growth dynamics left behind an 
internationally over-exposed banking sector which exceeded the size of country's 
GDP by nearly 10 times. The failure of Lehman Brothers and a global credit 
crunch, in turn, raised CDS rates on Icelandic banks which immediately declared 
insolvency after the global interbank lending froze. The paper provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic, banking and financial background 
of the crisis. It also provides a short-term analysis of Iceland's macroeconomic 
outlook. The main findings of the article conclude that the depth of financial crisis 
is attributed to the recent decade of unadjusted monetary policy which failed to 
prevent sharp appreciation of the krona and thus created sufficient conditions for 
significant asset-price inflation, high interest rate differential and the largest 
banking collapse in small and open economies. As the size of the banking sector 
was several times the country's GDP, Icelandic central bank failed to act as a lender 
of the last resort. The paper concludes that, to prevent future crises of similar 
proportions, it is impossible for a small country to have a large international 
banking sector, its own currency and an independent monetary policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While the economies of the world faced a gradual economic recovery from 
2008/2009 recession, economists are doing a lot of research to discover the 
real causes that led to the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Iceland is one of the 
biggest victims of the financial crisis. Estimates have shown that the fiscal 
cost of the financial crisis stems from a drastic drop of economic activity to 
surging unemployment and inflation. The financial crisis in the North 
Atlantic island has received not only a lot of attention from economists and 
policymakers but also a lot of publicity from the media after the country’s 
banking sector collapsed. 
 
In the past Iceland has faced significant and painful macroeconomic crises. 
When oil shocks hit the world economy, the Icelandic economy was badly 
hurt. In 1980s, inflation was rampant and persistent. In 1983, for example, 
the inflation rate reached as high as 100 percent annually. Policymakers 
actually embraced a somewhat higher inflation to mitigate the effect of 
macroeconomic instability on unemployment. Until the 1980s, Iceland 
pursued a false prosperity based on government intervention and 
involvement in economic activity. At the end of 1980s, Iceland began 
implementing economic reforms. Throughout the 1990s, the government 
trimmed personal and corporate tax rates, privatized state-owned 
companies, liberalized product and labor markets, deregulated the financial 
sector and reformed the pension system. The outcome of bold free-market 
reforms led to a decade of higher economic growth, lower inflation and one 
of the lowest rates of unemployment in the world. In early 2000s, the 
Icelandic economy had been showing signs of overheating. After the 
economy experienced a mild recession in 2002, the central bank of Iceland 
repeatedly raised interest rates as the inflation rate repeatedly exceeded its 
target limits. For years, the interest rate stood at double-digit levels. In a 
small and open economy such as Iceland, a significant difference between 
domestic and world interest rates boosts the so-called carry trading against 
uncovered interest parity. What happened is that investors were quite 
uncertain about the krona which had been one of the most unstable 
currencies in the world. As capital inflows came in, the krona appreciated 
remarkably. In such unusual circumstances, the banking sector took 
advantage of lower interest rates abroad and expanded its activities in Great 
Britain, the Nordic countries and the rest of the world. Thus, the three 
biggest banks drastically expanded their balance sheets enabled by the 
krona’s uncovered interest parity. In turn, the assets of Kaupthing, Glitnir 
and Landsbanki exceeded the size of Iceland’s economy by more than ten 
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times. The capital inflows, which led to the krona’s massive appreciation, 
became a part of the local money supply as Icelandic firms and households 
borrowed in high-yielding foreign currencies. When Bear Stearns was 
bailed out and when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, the financial crisis 
quickly spread around the world. For Icelandic banks, the painful scenario 
began after investors demanded a withdrawal of krona-denominated funds 
and securities from Icelandic banks and the stock market. In the aftermath, 
the krona strongly depreciated. Immediately, Iceland’s banking giants 
defaulted and were therefore insolvent. Rating agencies such as Moody, 
Fitch and S&P downgraded their outlook on sovereign debt. The outlook on 
krona was disastrous as the Icelandic currency received a BBB-midterm 
outlook. In addition, Icelandic government bonds were recently graded just 
one notch above junk-bond level. At the time of default, the gross external 
liabilities of the banking giants extended to 900 percent of Iceland’s GDP. 
Thus, the central bank could not act as a lender of the last resort as many 
central banks around the world were able to. The size of the banking sector 
was also far beyond the fiscal capacity of Iceland’s government. If interest 
rates were negative, then the inflation rate would climb close to three-digit 
levels. Thus, the three biggest banks failed and the financial crisis pushed 
Iceland into the deepest recession since World War II. The IMF extended 
Iceland an emergency loan to stabilize the banking sector and to pursue 
macroeconomic recovery. The financial crisis also induced a political crisis, 
street riots and protests. 
 
The main cause of the financial crisis in Iceland is a misguided monetary 
policy which inflated the business cycle, leading to excess demand for 
liquid funds whereas the foreign currency became a part of the domestic 
money supply. The macroeconomic future of Iceland is uncertain. While it 
became clear that the country’s banking sector grew too fast in response to 
monetary policy failures, it is still not clear whether Iceland should join the 
European Monetary Union. This paper brings a comprehensive insight into 
the unanswered dilemmas about Icelandic financial crisis and the country’s 
macroeconomic recovery. In Chapter 1, I review the Icelandic turnover from 
a period of false prosperity into a period of a decade-long high economic 
growth. Many authors and commentators have coined the term Icelandic 
model as a set of bold macroeconomic and structural reforms which boosted 
economic growth, standard of living and reduced unemployment. In Part II, 
I discuss the emergence of financial and economic crisis with 
comprehensive information about the dynamics of the main macroeconomic 
variables such as the interest rate, the inflation rate, foreign indebtedness 
and exchange rate. In Part III, I briefly analyze and summarize the main 
causes that led to the financial crisis in Iceland, largely focusing on the 
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metamorphosis of the banking sector and its unusually remarkable 
performance prior to the financial crisis. Part IV constitutes a central part of 
this paper. In this chapter, I discuss whether Iceland is an optimum currency 
area, hence, is it feasible for Iceland to enter the EMU, adopt the Euro and 
give up the krona as a legal tender. I discuss this issue from the perspectives 
of labor market, wages and prices, financial stability, interest rate dynamics, 
stock market, debt, fiscal and monetary policy. In Part V, I present some 
perspectives on the length of the economic recovery in Iceland. The 
summary and the main findings are presented in the conclusion. 
 
II. ICELANDIC ECONOMIC MODEL: FROM CRISIS TO PROSPERITY 
 
“Privatization, strong fiscal management and responsible leadership on the part of labor 
unions and employers have played a major part in the successful restructuring of the 
Icelandic economy. But many other factors have been important as well. The Central Bank 
was granted full independence and the Icelandic currency was floated in the market. Such a 
framework makes the economy more disciplined and solid.” 
 
David Oddsson, former prime minister of Iceland 
 
At the end of 1980s, after decades of Keynesian economic policy, the 
economy of Iceland was faced with rampant inflation, high unemployment 
and staggering economic growth. In 1983, after a series of unsuccessful 
fiscal policy attempts to cure the persistence of high inflation, the inflation 
rate reached as high as over 80 percent annually, all while monetary policy 
remained in status quo. As a result of deteriorating conditions in the 
dynamics of economic growth which followed after the process of 
disinflation began, between 1990 and 1995, GDP grew by 0.3 percent on 
average. After the end of the World War II, Iceland repeatedly experienced 
significant volatility of inflation which resulted from repeated increases in 
aggregate spending which created excessive purchasing power and led to 
inflation. The central bank boosted monetary aggregates and repeatedly 
reduced interest rate to stabilize the business cycle and boost an otherwise 
volatile economic growth. The inability of the central bank to pursue 
stabilization policies was due to three main reasons: (1) high inflation 
tarnished prospects of economic growth while the central bank believed that 
the expansion of the monetary base didn’t have any impact on real 
economic growth, (2) a negative real interest rate on general deposits meant 
that Icelandic banks could lend for investment and grant consumption loans 
only if the central bank speeded up credit facilities which, again, o 
inflationary pressures. (3) Fiscal policymakers believed that increasing 
government spending would boost aggregate demand and, further, economic 
growth. In reality, increasing government spending led to the spiral of 
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wages and prices since labor unions demanded further wage increases in the 
situation in which real purchasing power was tarnished. Nonetheless, as 
wages grew too fast compared to the productivity performance, the cycle of 
inflationary persistence continued. The inflationary dynamics was a result of 
demand-side and supply-side features. A turbulent macroeconomic 
environment meant not only extraordinary high inflation but also staggering 
economic growth and a volatile exchange rate. It is no surprise that the 
Icelandic krona is one of the least stable and most fluctuating currencies in 
the world. In 1991, when the new government under the leadership of David 
Oddsson was formed, there was a significant change in economic policy-
making. 
 
Graph 1: GDP per capita in Iceland (1980 - 2014) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2009) 
 
The main reforms, implemented between 1991 and 2004 were: 
 
• Reduction in government spending 
• Lower tax rates on labor and capital 
• Privatization of state-owned enterprises 
• Liberalization of the labor and product markets 
• Further economic integration with the World 
• Pension reform 
• Deregulation of the financial market 
• Reform of the public sector.  
 
While government spending as a share of the GDP actually increased from 
43.6 percent of the GDP in 1992 to 44.1 percent in 2004, major reforms 
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have been implemented and the Icelandic economy experienced an 
renaissance - a decade of robust economic growth, stable inflation and high 
employment. In 2002, when Iceland experienced a mild recession, mostly 
due to external imbalances, GDP contracted by about 1 percent,. When oil 
shocks emerged in 1973, Icelandic economy was trapped into the effects of 
negative supply shocks - high and persistent inflation and a surge in 
government spending. While government spending in the share of the GDP 
was moderate compared to the dysfunctional economies of Western Europe 
of the time, deep budget deficits prevailed between 1983 and 1995. In 1994, 
the budget deficit hit 4.7 percent of GDP. Even though government 
spending was not actually reduced, budget deficits were eliminated and thus 
there was less domestic crowding-out; a situation in which government 
spending displaces private investment which results in higher domestic 
interest rate and less favorable economic growth prospects. As a result of 
economic reforms, GDP grew by 3.8 percent on average between 1995 and 
2003. While real productivity plummeted between 1990 and 1995 by 0.3 
percent per annum on average, it grew 3.8 percent between 1995 and 2003. 
The main cause of the surge in labor productivity was a reduction in 
personal and corporate income tax rates. Aggregate tax burden as share of 
the GDP is lower than in other Nordic countries. Throughout the 1990s, 
Iceland has been steadily reducing the corporate income tax rate.  
 
Graph 2: Annual inflation rate (in %) 1980 - 2014 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2009) 
 
The rate was slashed from 45 percent in 1991 to 18 percent in 2001. In 
2007, Iceland implemented a 22.75 flat tax rate on personal income. 
Together with the local tax rate on personal income, the combined flat tax 
rate is 36 percent. Lower tax rates on labor and capital boosted productivity 
and gross capital formation which induced high economic growth 
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throughout 1990s. There is well-known empirical evidence that lower 
marginal tax rates on labor supply and productive behavior lead not only to 
higher after-tax income and return on investment but also to higher tax 
revenue - the relationship known as the Laffer curve. During the period of 
prosperity and robust economic growth, there was double evidence of the 
Laffer curve effect. Following a major reduction in the taxation of labor, 
average household income increased by more than 17 percent. In terms of 
corporate tax, the rate was reduced to 18 percent in 2002 after a sky-high 52 
percent in 1985. While high corporate tax burden collected only a tiny 
fraction of the revenue basis - 0.9 percent of GDP in 1985 - lower corporate 
tax not only increased real disposable household income but also raised tax 
revenue from 0.9 percent in 1985 to 1.5 percent in 2003. In 2008, Iceland 
further reduced the corporate income tax rate to 15 percent. 
 
Graph 3: Corporate Tax Revenue and Corporate Income Tax 
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Source: Ministry of Finance (2009) 
 
The fiscal policy has a powerful impact on economic growth since lower tax 
burden removes barriers to trade, entrepreneurship and wealth creation. 
However, economic policy has not made the tax burden permanently low. In 
fact, it moved from 26.2 percent of GDP in 1965 to 40 percent of GDP in 
2007. Throughout the 1990s, Iceland’s economic policymakers reduced tax 
burden and restricted government spending to prompt economic activity and 
propel the economy towards prosperity. The response of the private sector 
to pro-growth fiscal policy was immense. In the second half of the 1990s, 
real productivity grew significantly alongside the restructuring of the 
economy and the growth of the standard of living. Before the 1990s, 
Icelandic economy had been overwhelmed with the burden of state 
ownership of economic activities.  
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Throughout 1990s, the government launched privatization to remove the 
inherent distortions of state ownership. Faced with rioting inflation and 
discretionary monetary and fiscal policy, state-owned enterprises were 
unprofitable and business management and planning were far from optimal. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the value of privatized net assets was 1.568 million 
ISK or 17 percent of GDP. Privatizing inefficient state-owned companies 
caused Schumpeterian creative destruction as the restructuring of the 
backlash economy emerged and new investment opportunities flourished. 
Before the free-market reforms were launched, the dynamics of Iceland’s 
small-size financial system was impaired by restrictive regulation of the 
credit market. In addition to overregulated credit market, double-digit 
inflation eroded savings, reduced demand for real deposits, overexposed the 
commercial banks to the risk of default and pushed real interest rates 
negative. Meanwhile, the Icelandic krona further depreciated and boiled the 
risk of inflationary persistence. The comprehensive restructuring and 
privatization of the financial sector and monetary stabilization induced 
financial innovation as well as stock market performance. In addition to 
sound financial and monetary framework, general government debt was 
markedly reduced. Gross government debt shrank from 58.8 percent of GDP 
in 1995 to 27 percent in 2005. There was also a marked reduction in foreign 
debt, since the latter is an important indicator given the high interest rate 
differential between Iceland and the rest of the world. While in 1996, 
foreign debt represented 28.1 percent of the government’s gross debt, it was 
reduced to 7.7 percent of the gross government debt in 2006. In 2007/2008 
United Nations’ Human Development Index, Iceland occupied the 1st place. 
It also had the third longest life expectancy at birth in the World and its 
GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) was the 5th highest in the world. Iceland is 
also known for one of the most stable and sustainable retirement systems in 
the world. While the challenges of an ageing population are a significant 
macroeconomic concern, the outlook is favorable compared to other 
advanced countries given Iceland’s high birth rate, high long-term 
productivity prospects and asset-backed structure of the pension fund which 
is a key factor in demographic transition when a growing share of 
population is retiring while, at the same time, labor supply is diminishing. 
To mitigate the macroeconomic risk of staggering economic growth, high 
inflation and diminishing productivity performance, a larger size of net 
pension assets is needed alongside higher retirement age and flexible 
pension system. 
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Table 1: Pension Fund Net Assets in OECD Countries in 2007 
Country Asset size (% of the GDP) Country Asset growth (2001 - 2007) 
in percentage points 
Netherlands 138.05 Iceland 50 
Iceland 133.69 Netherlands 34.44 
Switzerland 119.18 Switzerland 16.72 
Finland 71.45 Finland 21.57 
Germany 4.11 Italy 1.02 
Italy 3.27 Germany 0.67 
Source: OECD Statistics (2009), author’s own calculation 
 
Iceland’s favorable demographic characteristics enabled the reform of the 
pension system which was based on prompting the working age and 
minimizing the incentives of early retirement. The pension system was split 
up into three pillars. The first pillar is tax-financed and guarantees a 
minimum pension. The second pillar is an occupational pension fund which 
is fully-funded, privately managed and based on a mandatory contribution. 
The third pillar is a voluntary one with individual savings accounts. During 
the period of robust economic growth, Iceland also liberalized the labor 
market, although it remains pretty rigid. There is a tight connection between 
labor market efficiency and sustainability of the pension system. The graph 
below shows the relationship between the average effective retirement age 
and rigidity of employment in OECD countries between 2002 and 2007. As 
expected, countries with lower effective retirement age, on average, tend to 
face more rigid labor market. A liberalized and deregulated labor market 
boosts people to work longer hours and avoid early retirement. This aspect 
is particularly strong and important since in most OECD countries, net 
financial liabilities to the retiring and retired population are exceeding GDP 
several times. Nordic countries and Iceland in particular face less risk of 
extensive fiscal pressure on government spending to fund the pension 
system through taxes and budget outlays. Former chief economist at 
Kaupthing bank once famously noted that “Iceland is a European country 
with American labor market.” Indeed, Icelanders have worked longer hours 
than the average annual working hours in Europe. The table below shows 
annual working hours in selected OECD countries. Not surprisingly, 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, productivity grew significantly. 
Nevertheless, in the long run, productivity is the main engine in the growth 
of standard of living. However, the 2008-2009 financial crisis has shackled 
the North Atlantic island and brought a painful recession with enormous 
politico-economic consequences. 
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Graph 4: Effective Retirement Age and Rigidity of Employment in OECD Countries between 
2002 and 2007 
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Table 2: Average Annual Hours worked in OECD Countries 
Country Average annual 
hours worked 
Average daily hours 
worked 
Korea 2265.6 9.44 
Iceland 1822.1 7.59 
Japan 1808 7.53 
United States 1798 7.49 
New Zealand 1750.7 7.29 
Canada 1732.5 7.21 
United Kingdom 1655 6.90 
… 
Belgium 1461 6.09 
France 1457 6.07 
Germany 1338.7 5.58 
Source: OECD Statistics (2009), author’s own calculation 
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
“On most measures, the small Icelandic economy is one of the most overheated in the 
OECD. Unemployment stands at 1 percent, wage growth is above 7 percent, and inflation 
is running above 4 percent despite a strong ISK. The current account deficit is closing in on 
20 percent of the GDP. The Icelandic central bank has been hiking rates substantially in 
order to cool the economy and rates are now above 10 percent. Based on the macro data 
alone, we think that the economy is heading for a recession in 2006-07. GDP could 
probably dip 5-10 percent in the next two years and inflation is likely to spike above 10 
percent as the ISK depreciates markedly. However, on top of the macro boom, there has 
been a stunning expansion of debt, leverage and risk-taking that is almost without 
precedence anywhere in the world. External debt is now at 300 percent of the GDP while 
short-term external debt is just short of 55 percent of the GDP. This is 133 percent of 
Icelandic export revenues.” 
 
    Danske bank, Iceland: Geyser Crisis, 2006 
 
At the end of 2008, Iceland experienced one of the most severe financial 
crises in the world since the end of World War II. The fiscal cost of the 
financial crisis is estimated at 65 percent of the GDP in euro terms, foreign 
obligations have risen to over 100 percent of GDP and the economy is 
expected to decline by 15 percent in krona terms. The banking system 
collapsed and the economy slipped into the deepest recession ever recorded 
in small and open economies in the last 20 years. The unemployment rate, 
which had been remarkably low in the recent decade, is expected to surpass 
10 percent in the next two years. In this chapter, I analyze the 
macroeconomic causes and origins that led to the emergence of financial 
and economic crisis in Iceland. 
 
Iceland is a small and open economy that gained tremendous benefits from 
international economic integration and free-market reforms implemented 
under the leadership of David Oddsson and Geir Haarde. However, the 
nature of the financial and economic crisis suggests that something has 
seriously gone wrong with the conduct of the monetary policy. One of the 
most important causes of the financial crisis was the misguided use of 
inflation targeting. In the late 20th century, Iceland experienced the most 
volatile inflation rates among advanced countries. Table 3 shows the 
inflationary dynamics in the OECD countries between 1980 and 2009. 
During that period, Iceland had the highest average inflation rate of all 
advanced OECD countries. The basic indicator of volatility in 
macroeconomic analysis is standard deviation which measures by how 
much the inflation rate has deviated from the average rate. Iceland also had 
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the highest standard deviation of inflation rate from 1980 to 2009. For 
instance, the standard deviation of inflation rate in Iceland during that 
period is 4.7 times the average standard deviation in OECD countries and 
2.98 times the average standard deviation in Nordic countries. 
 
Table 3: The Volatility of Inflation in OECD Countries (1980-2009) 
Country 
Average 
Inflation 
Rate 
(in %) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(in percentage 
points) 
Iceland 16.51 20.45 
Greece 11.24 7.96 
Portugal 8.39 7.87 
Italy 5.95 5.43 
New Zealand 5.53 5.40 
Ireland 4.90 5.09 
Sweden 4.52 4.15 
Spain 5.86 4.08 
France 3.72 3.62 
United Kingdom 4.02 3.53 
Norway 4.27 3.43 
Belgium 2.40 3.31 
Finland 3.72 3.24 
Australia 4.69 3.22 
Luxembourg 3.45 3.19 
Denmark 3.65 3.03 
Canada 3.60 2.96 
United States 3.69 2.92 
Japan 1.17 1.90 
Switzerland 2.18 1.88 
Netherlands 2.46 1.79 
Germany 2.31 1.64 
Austria 2.60 1.61 
OECD 4.79 4.34 
Nordic countries 6.53 6.86 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2009), author’s own estimate 
 
The cyclical behavior of Iceland’s inflation dynamics is an important factor 
in explaining the recent financial and economic crisis. In the 20th century, 
the Icelandic economy had gone through a windy turmoil of unstable 
inflation. In 1974, the inflation rate reached 43 percent, mostly as a 
consequence of the 1973 oil shock. In 1983, the inflation rate moved above 
80 percent annually and decreased to 30 percent in 1988. As the empirical 
estimates showed, Iceland’s inflation rate has been above the average of the 
OECD. In taming the unpredictable and volatile inflation rate, the central 
banks in advanced countries used the framework of inflation targeting to 
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deliver low, predictable and stable inflation rates. After the central bank 
adopted the inflation targeting rule in 2001, the inflation rate has been 
constantly out of central bank’s tolerance range. To mitigate the overheating 
of the economy and unpredictable inflation rate, the central bank kept the 
interest rates high, exceeding 15 percent. Graph 5 shows the dynamics of 
general interest rates on non-indexed and indexed loans. Since 2001, the 
Icelandic economy had been growing very fast after the mild recession. The 
average economic growth rate between 2003 and 2007 was 5.51 percent. 
The economy expanded most rapidly in 2004 and 2005 when it grew by 
7.72 percent and 7.45 percent on the annual basis respectively. To mitigate 
the inflationary pressures, the central bank raised general interest rate. 
 
Graph 5: General Interest Rates on Loans 
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Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009) 
 
As the central bank failed to contain the inflation rate within target limits, 
high domestic interest rates encouraged domestic firms and households to 
borrow in foreign currency. In small and open economies, such as Iceland, 
high domestic interest rates boost currency speculation and carry trading 
against uncovered interest parity. A high interest rate differential between 
the home country and the world means that the domestic currency is 
exposed to speculation and may be over-appreciated. This is exactly what 
happened in Iceland. As foreign borrowing and the inflow of foreign 
currency grew significantly, the Icelandic krona appreciated rapidly. A 
combination of massive foreign currency inflow, currency appreciation and 
high domestic interest rates pumped the bubble of economic growth and 
inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, the real sector went through the 
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economic boom as many new sectors emerged ranging from software 
development, biotechnology and a growing financial sector. However, the 
foreign currency effectively became a part of the local money supply. 
Meanwhile, the krona has appreciated further and sent a signal of rapid 
over-appreciation. In such detrimental macroeconomic environment, the 
central bank should build up foreign reserves as an insurance against the 
possibility of rapid currency depreciation and a strongly negative mid-term 
macroeconomic outlook. In spite of great opportunities to build up foreign 
reserves, the central bank did not increase the size of foreign reserves that 
could prevent the depreciation of the local currency. When the financial 
crisis erupted in late 2008 and early 2009, rapid currency depreciation 
became inevitable. Massive foreign debt, created mostly by the financial 
sector, was 8 times the size of Iceland’s GDP. The immense size of the 
foreign debt evolved as a consequence of the fact that Icelandic banks did 
not insure the borrowing and credit activity with depository basis. In fact, 
between 1990 and 2007, the average interest rate on general deposits was -
2.27 percent. Graph 6 shows a time series of the real interest rate on general 
loans and deposits. In such circumstances, demand for real deposits is 
usually compensated by borrowing and foreign expansion. After the 
beginning of the financial crisis, Iceland’s former three major commercial 
banks (Kaputhing, Glintir, Landisbanki) faced significant solvency and 
liquidity problems. In fact, the balance sheet of the country’s banking sector 
represents 900 percent of the annual GDP. The fundamental insolvency 
issue of the Icelandic banking sector was that hold-to-maturity value of 
assets was insufficient to cover its obligations.  
 
Graph 6: Real Interest Rate on General Deposits and Loans 
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The main concerns for the instability of the Iceland’s financial sector were 
extensive foreign currency funding, overdraft spreads of credit default swaps, 
high interest rate differential between Iceland and the rest of the world and an 
increasing stock of debt which emerged from increased financing of 
mortgages. After the banking sector exerted symptoms of insolvency and 
liquidity problems and as the krona depreciated further, major commercial 
banks were unable to obtain short-term funding. As a consequence of 
currency depreciation, inflation soared. In January 2009, the inflation rate 
was 18.6 percent. In the following months, it shrank to 17.6 percent and 15.2 
percent respectively.  
 
Graph 7: Foreign Debt relative to GDP and Export Revenue 
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Graph 8: Foreign Debt - Institutional Breakdown 
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As a small and open economy, Iceland’s extensive size of the banking sector 
compared to its GDP had been a sign of potential macroeconomic and 
financial deterioration. The relative size of the Icelandic banking system 
meant that the central bank could hardly be the lender of the last resort, given 
the lack of periodic increases in foreign reserves for stabilization purposes. 
As the oversized banking system poses a huge systemic risk, small and open 
economies such as Iceland face a trade-off between its own currency and 
membership in the monetary union. If the country opts for a single currency, 
the only remaining way to prevent the outbreak of the financial crisis, due to 
liquidity and solvency risk of the country’s banking system, is to relocate 
foreign currency-based banking activities abroad to avoid the interest risk due 
to high interest rate differential between Iceland and the rest of the world. As 
central banks around the world continuously lowered the interest rate targets, 
the interest rate differential increased further as well as the differences in 
inflation rate between Iceland and the rest of the world. On the other hand, if 
the country joins the monetary union, its central bank is no longer the lender 
of the last resort. As the wide differential between interest rates disappeared, 
currency hedging would not emerge as extensively as it did during periods of 
appreciation of the krona. If Iceland joined the EMU, the financial crisis 
would not be as turbulent as it was mostly due to exogenous interest rate and 
adoption of Euro which is a global reserve currency that would hardly have 
any appreciable effect on krona. However, several academic studies showed 
that Iceland does not fulfill the criteria for optimum currency area. As the 
central bank maintained the highest interest rate in the developed world, the 
outbreak of the financial crisis also brought a significant supply-side shock to 
the private sector as the banking system collapsed and defaulted which erased 
the credit activity to finance investment. While a vast majority of advanced 
countries experienced a deflationary recession, Iceland faced a turbulent 
inflation that has exceeded 10 percent ever since the second half of 2008. 
Excessive inflation emerged as a consequence of central bank’s effort to 
address the solvency problem of Icelandic banks with domestic currency 
while the krona depreciated significantly. The deterioration of krona’s 
effective real exchange rate meant that the central bank could act as a lender 
of the last resort only to the extent of its foreign currency reserves and the 
ability to borrow at foreign exchange. As the krona lost two thirds of its 
value, the inflation accelerated significantly as a consequence of excess 
demand. If Iceland were a full-member of the EMU, none of its banks could 
fail due to illiquidity alone. However, if Iceland remained out of the 
Euroarea, then running an internationally active banking sector whose size 
exceeds the country’s GDP several times and, at the same time, having its 
own currency would not be a viable option as a series of macroeconomic 
risks emerged including a greater probability of financial crisis, currency 
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over-appreciation due to excessive interest rate differential and greater 
volatility and instability of output and inflation. 
 
Graph 9: Real Effective Exchange Rate ISK/EUR 2000 - 2009 
 
Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service (2009) 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Iceland’s macroeconomic deteriorated 
significantly. By January 2009, Moody downgraded the outlook on Icelandic 
government bond to Baa-negative in both foreign and local currency. In 
addition, Fitch negatively rated Iceland’s sovereign debt to BBB- in the light 
of unstable public finance, depreciated currency outlook, unpredictable 
macroeconomic forecast and debt repayment default after the collapse of the 
banking sector. Meanwhile, at the IMF, Iceland asked for a 2.1 billion USD 
emergency plan to restore confidence in the banking system, stabilize the 
krona and achieve medium-term fiscal consolidation. In exchange for the 
emergency loan, the IMF immediately requested the launch of 
comprehensive macroeconomic policy aimed at reducing the interest rate, 
lifting capital controls, restructuring the collapsed banking sector, midterm 
fiscal consolidation and restructuring of the household debt. The new frontier 
of the macroeconomic policy and the severe recession that hit the economy in 
2008 and 2009 is likely to have a significant impact on medium term 
economic growth, inflation, unemployment and current account deficit which 
reached -34.65 percent of the GDP in 2008. In 2009, the Icelandic economy 
is expected to decline by 10.6 percent. Meanwhile, it seems that the inflation 
rate peaked in January 2009 as it posted a decreasing cyclical trend at the 
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beginning of the second quarter of 2009. In the next chapter I discuss whether 
Iceland’s membership in the EMU could mitigate potential macroeconomic 
instability in the future. 
 
IV. WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS? 
 
There is a realm of causes that inflicted the financial crisis in Iceland. There 
is a widespread belief that the deregulation and privatization of the banking 
sector is the ultimate root of the country’s financial crisis. The three largest 
commercial banks, Glintir, Landisbanki and Kaupthing, had total assets of 
more than $168 billion USD, or 14 times Iceland’s GDP. When total assets 
exceed a country’s economy by several times, the central bank inevitably 
fails as the lender of the last resort, mostly because it is almost impossible to 
build up strong foreign reserves that enable the central bank to act as a lender 
of the last resort. The ultimate causes of Iceland’s financial crisis ought to be 
searched in the failure of the central bank’s mismatched regulation of the 
banking sector and its failure to forecast the possibility of the financial crisis 
in a series of policymaking failures among which the wrong use of inflation 
targeting is the headline failure. The expansion of banking activities abroad 
was a reasonable consequence of the high interest rate which did not 
stimulate domestic investment in krona-denominated loans. Instead the 
banking sector was seeking loans in foreign currency which brought a 
significant appreciation of the krona and, at the same time, increased the 
exposure of the banking sector to foreign shocks. In 2009, the Icelandic 
economy is expected to contract by 10.2 percent. The output contraction will 
also continue in 2010, by 0.2 percent. The question whether the central bank 
could have prevented the crisis needs a macroeconomic explanation. After 
the Icelandic economy shrank into the 2002 recession, there was a negative 
output gap and fiscal policymakers enacted further tax cuts to boost the 
economy’s short-term growth potential. After the short-lived recession, the 
economy boomed. In 2004, the economic growth rate was 7.7 percent. The 
following year the economy expanded by 7.45 percent. Robust growth 
continued all the way to 2007, when output increased by 5.5 percent. In the 
meantime, the central bank raised the discount rate on overnight loans from 
8.25 percent in 2004 to 15.25 percent in 2007. However, the share of 
domestic loans in the portfolio of major banks remained negligible. As the 
banking sector expanded internationally, there was a high probability of a 
growing external indebtedness that would vastly exceed the fiscal and reserve 
capacity of the Icelandic economy and its central bank. As banks expanded 
abroad to places such as the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and the Nordic 
countries, loans were not backed by either deposits or reserve currency. This 
means that, given high leverage of the banks’ balance sheets, lending 
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operations were driven by debt. As soon as world credit markets froze in the 
light of failure of Lehman Brothers and the collapse of Bear Stearns, the 
Icelandic banks were unable to fuel their lending capacity and thus unable to 
fulfill its depository obligations. The data indicate that the Kaupthing, 
Landsbanki and Glitnir recorded unusually remarkable financial results at the 
end of 2007 after a compelling performance in previous years. Between 2003 
and 2007, Kaupthing’s borrowings increased by 700 percent while the P/E 
ratio steadily declined. Between 2003 and 2007, the P/E ratio decreased by 
24.6 percent - from 12.2 to 9.2. In 2007, all three major banks witnessed a 
significant drop in RoE (return-on-equity). Landsbanki’s RoE fell from 36.3 
percent in 2006 to 27.1 percent in 2007 while Glintir’s after-tax RoE 
decreased from 39.4 percent in 2006 to 19.3 percent in 2007. After the 
financial crisis eventually erupted, the banking sector was unable to bear the 
depository obligations given significant borrowing arrangements which 
propelled the gross liabilities of all three major banks to 900 percent of 
Iceland’s GDP while asset prices were falling and put an enormous pressure 
on already highly leveraged balance sheets. Consequently, bond rating 
agencies downgraded the outlook on the ability of three major lenders to 
repay bond obligations until the lenders defaulted. Meanwhile their debt grew 
enormously. The Economist nicely summarized the nature of Icelandic 
economic and financial crisis: 
 
“The country’s three largest banks have expanded headlong abroad since 
two of them were privatised in 2003, amassing assets of about €125 billion 
($180 billion) by the end of 2007, compared with an economy of just €14.5 
billion. Many of these assets were funded by lenders in fickle wholesale 
markets. In early 2006 less than 30 cents in every loan issued was backed 
by deposits. Iceland’s households also racked up debts amounting to 213% 
of disposable income. Britons and Americans owed just 169% and 140% of 
disposable income respectively—figures that make them seem almost sober 
by comparison.” 
 
Source: The Economist, Kreppanomics, October 9, 2008 
 
Prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, Icelandic banks strongly 
increased after-tax return-on-equity (RoE). The offset of the RoE can also be 
attributed to a series of corporate income tax cuts which boosted after-tax 
corporate revenue. In 2004 and 2005, Landsbanki’s RoE was 49.5 and 45.8 
percent respectively. When the financial crisis emerged, the banking sector 
was immediately affected and as asset prices were falling, the key 
performance ratios dropped as rates, earnings and share prices contained real 
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information about the equity, liabilities and leverage of the Iceland’s banking 
sector until the major banks defaulted respectively. 
 
The financial crisis in Iceland is not a result of an immediate set of measures 
that caused the failure of highly leveraged banking sector but rather a 
consequence of a combination of global financial crisis and a series of 
mismatched macroeconomic policies that had not foreseen the real possibility 
of a financial and economic crisis. Iceland’s central bank adopted inflation 
targeting in 2001 with a 2.5 percent target rate of inflation. In spite of the 
central bank’s commitment to mitigate inflationary pressures, the inflation 
rate was constantly above the target rate. Graph 10 shows the monthly 
inflation dynamics in Iceland from 2003 onwards. 
 
Graph 10: Inflation dynamics 2003-2009 
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Strong inflationary pressures, when interest rates were already high and 
economic growth robust, meant that the economic performance was 
overheated, as the real economic activity outperformed the potential 
economic activity. In normal circumstances, the central bank would raise the 
interest rates to prevent further inflationary pressures. However, the Icelandic 
banking sector denominated the majority of its lending and depository 
operations in foreign currency and, thus, raising the interest rate further 
would tend to push the real exchange rate towards rapid over-appreciation. In 
such a situation, as the crises accelerated, currency collapse would be 
inevitable. Following the development of the crisis, it seems that central bank 
assumed that major banks do not face liquidity and solvency problems and 
thus hadn’t built up foreign reserves of a size that would enable the bank to 
act as a lender of the last resort. From a comprehensive point of view, the 
precise use of inflation targeting and restructuring of the banking sector to 
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minimize the pressure on financial stability could have mitigated the effects 
of the financial crisis at the cost of less robust economic growth which the 
Icelandic economy experienced in recent years. If inflation targeting had been 
used precisely, the central bank’s interest rate policy could easily have been 
stabilized. Presumably, lower interest rate differential would probably not 
boost borrowing in foreign currencies while, at the same, leading Icelandic 
krona to appreciate above the predicted limits. When the krona significantly 
depreciated in the light of the financial crisis, the central bank was caught in a 
trap. It couldn’t raise interest rates further and, at the same time, lowering 
interest rates would boost inflationary pressures at the times of high 
uncertainty. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the main question is 
whether Iceland should join the EMU to secure itself against similar 
macroeconomic shocks. This topic is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
V. IS ICELAND AN OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA? 
 
Immense consequences of Icelandic financial and economic crisis have raised 
the question whether Iceland should join the European Monetary Union by 
giving up the independence of monetary policy. In economic theory and 
analysis, the accession of a country to a currency union ultimately depends 
on the criteria of optimum currency area. In the following section, I analyze 
macroeconomic scenarios and discuss whether Iceland is an optimum 
currency area and is it therefore economically feasible for Iceland to adopt 
the single currency and enter the monetary union to mitigate the shocks that 
could prevent the wide fluctuations in economic growth and financial 
stability. 
 
Wage and price flexibility 
 
Wage and price flexibility represents the principal indicator in judging 
whether it is feasible for a country to join the monetary union. The conduct of 
the monetary policy demands a high degree of price and wage flexibility. If 
prices adjust quickly to changes in productivity and external factors, the 
central bank is less likely to cause any asymmetric shocks that could distort 
the job market, economic growth or financial markets. When nominal prices 
and wages within countries contemplating a single currency are flexible, the 
adjustment to economic shocks is less likely to cause persistent inflation or 
unemployment in either country. The Icelandic experience with price and 
wage rigidity is timid. Between 1950 and 1990, the main objectives of 
economic policy were maintaining full employment and guaranteeing profits 
to fisheries and policymakers therefore embraced higher inflation. Therefore 
when the fisheries sector expanded rapidly, wages and costs had risen and led 
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to sustained inflationary spikes. This issue had been crucial because 
worsening external conditions in state-owned fisheries sector were solved 
through currency devaluation which led to an increase in inflation. The 
empirical estimates of real wage flexibility in Iceland found that real wages 
responded quickly to shocks - a pattern known for a small and open 
economy. In fact, real wages increased in the wake of favorable 
macroeconomic shocks and declined in the wake of adverse shocks. A report 
by the Central Bank of Iceland from 1997 explored the dynamics of real 
wage adjustment. In dynamic terms, real wages dropped considerably when 
the rate of unemployment rose. One possible alternative to affect real wages 
is the exchange rate policy. In Iceland, exchange rate devaluations were often 
used to prompt the revenue of exporting firms in domestic currency. On the 
other hand, devaluation or aligned currency depreciation reduces costs by 
lowering real wages. If Iceland joined the EMU, it could no longer use 
exchange rate as a policy set to respond shocks. If Iceland were an optimal 
currency area economically eligible for the adoption of the Euro, one of the 
foremost goals of economic policy would be to foster nominal wage 
flexibility. If nominal wages are flexible, there is practically no space for 
exchange rate intervention that could create upward inflationary pressures 
assuming managed domestic currency depreciation. The adjustment of 
nominal wages to economic shocks is the essence of the rule of keeping 
nominal wage growth in line with productivity growth. If nominal wages are 
rigid, the fluctuation of economic activity and internal shocks create an 
inflexible labor market that hinders productivity growth and adds more 
pressure on labor costs which calls for more interventionist economic policy 
as trade unions feel reluctant to drop the monopoly rents enabled by regulated 
labor market. Therefore, keeping nominal wages and prices straight by 
stimulating labor market liberalization and deregulation is the essential 
pursuit of economic policy in creating an optimal currency area. 
 
Mobility of Labor 
 
Labor market mobility is one of the keys in creating an optimum currency 
area. If the labor market is immobile, firms often alter real factor prices while 
the economic policymakers pursue real exchange rate intervention. Since 
labor market liberalization tends to reduce disparities between labor markets 
in currency union such as the EMU, persistent regulation of the labor market 
reduces productivity and spurs asymmetric cost pressures and productivity 
distribution within the currency union. The country is eligible in the mobility 
of labor if it has a sound and deregulated labor market, sound productivity 
growth and flexible labor market structure. Iceland’s labor market closely 
resembles the U.S and Canadian patterns, with limited regulation, strong 
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productivity performance, comparatively smaller hiring and firing costs and 
less institutional rigidity in the labor market itself. An academic study by 
Norwegian economists Steinar Holden and Fredrik Wulsfberg (2007) 
explored the rigidity of nominal wages in the OECD. The authors found that 
wage rigidity is more likely to occur if the density of trade union membership 
is high and when the employment protection legislation is in place. In case of 
a small and open economy, productivity shocks are crucial to long-run 
economic growth. According to 2008-2009 Global Competitiveness Report 
(WEF), Iceland’s labor market is advantageous in terms hiring and firing 
costs while disadvantageous in terms of flexibility of wage determination. 
Persistent barriers in the labor market such as institutional rigidities, high 
non-wage salary cost and inflexible wage determination diminish the 
mobility of the labor market and increase unemployment. High minimum 
wage is an obvious cause for long-term unemployment and a detrimental 
obstacle to full-fledged mobility in the labor market. High union wages, 
which are usually above competitive market wages, likely cause 
unemployment in the non-unionized sector of the economy. As union wages 
exceed market wages, union members often feel reluctant to accept an 
alternative employment. Table 4 shows the indicators of labor market 
mobility in Iceland and OECD. 
 
Table 4: Labor Market Mobility in OECD in 2007 
Country Productivity Growth 
in % (2000-2007) 
Firing costs 
(weeks of wages) 
Unemployment rate 
(in %) 
Ireland 3.1 24 4.5 
Iceland 3.0 13 1.0 
Sweden 2.3 26 6.1 
Finland 2.2 26 6.8 
United States 2.0 0 4.6 
United Kingdom 2.0 22 5.4 
Australia 1.7 4 4.4 
France 1.5 32 8.3 
Norway 1.4 13 2.5 
Germany 1.4 69 8.4 
Switzerland 1.1 13 2.5 
Denmark 0.7 0 2.7 
Italy 0.0 11 6.1 
Source: OECD, World Bank, IMF World Economic Outlook (2009) 
 
From a structural point of view, the Icelandic labor market resembles the U.S 
and Canadian ones. Prior to the emergence of the financial crisis, Iceland had 
the lowest unemployment rate in OECD. In 2007, the unemployment rate 
reached 1.0 percent of the total labor force. The official estimate of 
unemployment rate for 2009 is 9.7 percent. Between 2000 and 2007, Iceland 
had recorded the second highest growth rate of productivity in the OECD. 
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Only catching-up economies of Visegrad countries and Ireland recorded 
better productivity improvements than Iceland. While higher productivity 
growth in Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Poland is purely 
the result of the real convergence, Ireland and Iceland’s comparative 
productivity performance was mostly attributed to spillovers from direct 
foreign investments, less institutional rigidity in the labor market and more 
flexible hiring and firing regulations. The financial crisis and the recession of 
2008-2009 increased unemployment rate. The labor market will probably 
absorb most of the recessionary shock through lower or possibly zero 
productivity growth. In this respect, flexible adjustment of nominal wages to 
changes in economic growth, inflation and unemployment is essential to 
preserve and further boost mobility of the labor market. The flexibility of the 
labor market is an important comparison of similarities between labor 
markets of countries in the monetary union and country outside the monetary 
union. More similarities imply less asymmetric shocks that could hurt any 
country. 
 
Financial Markets, Monetary Stability and Asymmetric Shocks 
 
An important characteristic of the Icelandic financial market in the last ten 
years has been a rapid development following the deregulation and 
privatization of the banking sector. Concerning the financial crisis, many 
experts underlined the key role of the banking sector that contributed to the 
emergence of the financial crisis. The Icelandic banking sector was 
characterized by an outward-oriented strategy. Significant rises in real estate 
prices, driven by low mortgage rates, fuelled spending against unanticipated 
assets gains in the future. High level of liquidity in the international financial 
markets led to the surge of demand for Icelandic stocks and bonds. Strong 
capital inflows led to the surge in the Icelandic krona. Between 2000 and 
2005, the Icelandic krona appreciated by 27 percent. The rise in general 
spending on high-risk investment propelled stock market performance. 
According to Credit Suisse, OMX ICEX15 rose by an incredible 500 percent 
between 2003 and 2008. Picture 12 shows time series of turnover on 
Icelandic stock market relative to GDP between 1993 and 2007. 
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Graph 11: Stock Market Turnover (1993 - 2007) 
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High levels of liquidity in international financial markets and a surge in 
spending on investment led to a strong demand for Icelandic stocks and 
bonds which increased total stock market turnover significantly in from 2002 
onwards. Privatization of the banking sector in 1990s and early 2000s led to 
significant improvements in access to credit markets. While the Icelandic 
krona performed weakly in the foreign exchange market, widespread foreign 
currency borrowing increased dramatically to support high domestic 
consumption. For instance, between 2002 and 2008, total consumption 
expenditure on durable and non-durable goods grew by 77.16 percent. 
Meanwhile, the central bank kept domestic interest rate high to contain 
demand-side inflationary pressures. Foreign borrowing in international 
capital markets with low interest rate triggered macroeconomic imbalances as 
household debt grew tremendously. Official estimates suggest that the 
indebtedness of Icelandic households amounted to 213 percent of disposable 
income. If the Icelandic krona had not appreciated, the share of debt in 
household disposable income would have increased further. Capital inflows 
from abroad, significant rise in investment expenditure and low national 
savings rate put additional internal pressure on inflation and balance of 
payments deficit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
Graph 12: The OMX Iceland 15 (2002-2008) 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2009) 
 
The deficit had to be financed by borrowing funds from international capital 
markets. The initial impulse raised the demand for Icelandic stocks and 
bonds. In turn, the three largest Icelandic banks borrowed heavily in 
international capital market and, consequently, their leverage grew 
significantly. As the balance of payments deficit reached 25 percent of GDP 
at the end of 2006, the central bank had to raise the interest rate from 10 
percent to 15.5 percent to avoid the upward pressure on inflation. However, 
the real source of the imbalances came from bull-trended real estate market 
where mortgage lending rates remained virtually low and fixed for a longer 
period of time. As a result of extremely sensitive volatility of the Icelandic 
krona, carry trading against uncovered interest parity flourished. In fact, by 
the end of 2006, external liabilities of the Icelandic banking sector reached 
517 percent of GDP while external assets amounted to 395 percent of GDP, 
compared to total assets of 800 percent of GDP. In 2006, when the Icelandic 
economy showed signs of overheating with an inflation rate reaching as 
much as 9 percent annually, the exchange rate appreciated by about 25 
percent while equity prices fell by 25 percent which further inflated the return 
on equity. For example, in 2006 Kaupthing’s RoE reached 42.4 percent. The 
volatility of the Icelandic currency has been a significant issue since currency 
volatility accentuated stock market volatility and thus, shares denominated in 
ISK were unattractive and this led to information asymmetry. Even though 
the banking sector was fully hedged against Icelandic krona, the interest rate 
spread between Iceland and the rest of the world further induced foreign 
borrowing and hence the external liabilities were further inflated and 
surpassing the size of the GDP several times. Consequently, bond rating 
agencies such as Moody, Fitch and S&P downgraded bond ratings of major 
Icelandic banks and thus foreign banks demanded significantly higher risk 
premium to extend loans to the banks. While the central bank raised the 
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policy rate, the economy had not contracted as expected but continued to 
grow as the aggregate demand further increased subject to extensive foreign 
borrowing and interest rate spread caused excess capacity in stock market 
that output activity could not pertain. Graph 13 displays the interbank interest 
rate differential between Iceland and its major trading partners. In addition, 
Table 4 shows the dynamics of quarterly interbank interest rate in Iceland, 
United States, EMU and the United Kingdom. 
 
Graph 13: Monthly interest rate differential between Iceland and its major trading partners 
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Table 5: Quarterly Immediate Interbank Interest Rates 
 Q4-2007 Q1-2008 Q2-2008 Q3-2008 Q4-2008 Q1-2009 
Iceland 14.04 15.26 15.75 15.75 18.25 14.25 
United States 4.24 2.61 2.00 1.81 0.16 0.18 
EMU 3.88 4.09 4.01 4.27 2.49 1.06 
United Kingdom 5.60 5.31 5.03 4.89 1.65 0.52 
Source: OECD (2009), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2009) 
 
The gross government debt is estimated to reach 176.8 percent of the GDP by 
2010 considering the downside scenario. Graph 14 depicts the gross 
government debt between 2007 and 2012 considering positive and downside 
scenario. The alarming state of Iceland’s public finances has been recently 
analyzed by rating agencies. Table 6 shows the report on Iceland’s sovereign 
credit by Moody. Government bond rating outlook remains bleak and 
negative in the light of massive government debt that resulted from the 
nationalization of the losses of the banking sector as well as from credit lines 
given by Nordic countries and emergency loan from the IMF. The question 
that is perhaps the most interesting is whether the adoption of Euro as a legal 
tender would be a sufficient shelter against possible banking and financial 
crises in the future. Could Iceland mitigate the macroeconomic imbalances if 
it were a fully-integrated member of the EMU? In forecasting the 
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macroeconomic scenario of the exit from the financial crisis, Fitch recently 
commented the Iceland’s possibility of joining the EMU: 
 
“Recent events have reopened the debate about the merits of joining the 
euro area: euro membership would have rendered Iceland’s external 
imbalances less dominant, eliminated currency risk and allowed Iceland’s 
fiscal policy strengths to better assert themselves… However, unilateral 
adoption of the euro would have little to commend it, since it would deny 
Iceland the advantages that the formal membership in the euro area 
brings. Thus, in the context of the current crisis, the Central Bank of 
Iceland would have been denied access to ECB reserves and ‘lender of the 
last resort’ support could have proved invaluable in Iceland’s case.” 
 
Source: Fitch Ratings, Iceland: A Difficult Road Ahead, December 2008 
 
Table 6: Iceland’s Sovereign Credit 
 Foreign currency Local currency 
Government bond rating Baa1-negative Baa1-negative 
Country ceiling A2-negative Aaa 
Bank deposit celing Baa1-negative A1 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service, January 2009 
 
Membership in the EMU is defined in the Maastricht treaty which effectively 
sets the macroeconomic criteria that a country must comply to enter to 
eurozone and acquire the euro as a legal tender. The criteria are divided into 
monetary and fiscal criteria. The monetary criteria involve the inflation rate 
and interest rate requirements while fiscal criteria involve public debt and 
budget deficit. First, the inflation rate must be no higher 1.5 percentage 
points above the average of three countries with the lowest rate of inflation. 
Second, long-term nominal interest rates are required to be no more than 2 
percentage points higher than in the three countries with the lowest rate of 
inflation measured as harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP). Third, 
the ratio of government debt to GDP must not exceed 60 percent of GDP. 
And fourth, the ratio of budget deficit to GDP must not exceed 3 percent at 
the end of the preceding fiscal year. In Iceland, the macroeconomic 
imbalances have worsened the economic stability and the fiscal cost of 
financial crisis is pretty high. The short-term macroeconomic outlook looks 
bleak. The foremost requirement for the membership in the EMU is the 
membership in Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) where the currency 
fluctuation is expected to be contained within a 2.25 percent limit. The 
experience has shown that the Icelandic krona is one of the most volatile 
currencies in both the OECD and in the world. Prior to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis, defending the krona via a managed floating exchange rate 
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could have triggered a series of macroeconomic shocks stemming from 
output fluctuation, the persistence of inflation and current account deficit. 
Table 7 evaluates whether Iceland is eligible for the EMU membership. 
 
Graph 14: Gross Government Debt (2008-2012) 
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Source: Moody’s Investor Service, January 2009 
 
Table 4: Maastricht criteria and EMU membership in 2008 
 Inflation 
rate 
(in %) 
Interest rate 
(in %) 
Public debt 
(% of the 
GDP) 
Budget 
deficit/surplus 
(% of the 
GDP) 
Fulfilment 
of criteria 
Reference value max. 3.2 max. 6.5 max. 60 max. -3  
Denmark 3.6 5.2 33.3 3.6 Mostly yes 
Sweden 3.3 4.2 38.0 2.5 Mostly yes 
Norway 3.4 2.0 50.0 18.8 Mostly yes 
United Kingdom 3.6 0.5 52.0 -5.5 Mostly yes 
Iceland 12.8 17.0 103 -14.3 No 
Sources: Eurostat (2009) 
 
In a macroeconomic perspective, Iceland fulfills neither the Maastricht 
criteria nor the optimum currency area criteria. The main obstacles to the 
objective of sound macroeconomic environment for the currency union were 
an extremely volatile floating currency, high interest rate, high inflation rate, 
huge government debt and deficit. The imprecise use of inflation targeting by 
the central bank also left the Icelandic krona vulnerable to external shocks. 
The reestablishment of macroeconomic stability in Iceland requires a 
thorough cooperation between fiscal and monetary policies. Iceland, once the 
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country with the healthiest public finances in the OECD, suddenly faced the 
second highest public debt to GDP ratio in the OECD, only after Japan.The 
medium-term macroeconomic stabilization in Iceland will be essential to the 
future of monetary policy in the country. In a hypothetical case, if Iceland 
joined the EMU, the central bank would have to defend the krona to contain 
it within the limit range and the fiscal policymakers would have to reduce the 
size of government deficit and public debt to meet the fiscal criteria for the 
membership in the EMU. The accession of Iceland to the EMU would indeed 
eliminate currency risks and reduce the external imbalances such as the 
worrying current account deficit that pose a serious threat to macroeconomic 
stability. However, it would be a serious illusion to believe that an immediate 
membership in the EMU would promptly restore the economic stability. The 
size of the public debt, which is a whooping worry to economic 
policymakers, is expected to diminish substantially and the macroeconomic 
forecasts predict the full recovery will take several years before fiscal health 
is restored and full monetary stability with low, predictable and stable 
inflation at the forefront is achieved. Small and open economies such as 
Iceland tend to absorb benefits from monetary integration faster than their 
bigger peers. However, the crucial stage of economic policy will be to tame 
the spiral of an uncertain and volatile inflation outlook and to trim the 
spending pressures in real estate market that led to the substantial overheating 
of the economy in the recent decade. The elimination of currency risk could 
substantially reduce asymmetric shocks on equity prices. One of the inflating 
factors of Icelandic financial crisis was the imprecise use of inflation 
targeting as the central bank failed to contain the inflation within the target 
range. In spite of a relatively high interest rate, the economy had not 
contracted as the foreign borrowing continually eased the domestic demand 
but at the expense of an oversized banking sector which the central bank 
could not bail out and therefore act as the lender of the last resort for. In the 
normal course of macroeconomic stabilization, it may take several years 
before Iceland will fulfill the Maastricht criteria alongside the stabilization of 
the Icelandic krona against external shocks. 
 
The membership in the currency union requires mobile labor markets, 
flexible price adjustment, prudent fiscal policy and similar structure of 
financial markets. These criteria are essential in mitigating asymmetric 
shocks. In financial markets of small and open economies, a high interest rate 
spread induces carry trading against uncovered interest parity which expands 
the fluctuation of domestic currency that is nevertheless vulnerable to 
external shocks and macroeconomic imbalances. 
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The empirical studies that examined whether it is feasible for Iceland join the 
EMU found that the country does not fulfill the criteria of optimum currency 
area. However, external shocks in the Icelandic economy were found to be 
asymmetric alongside the rigidity of nominal wages. Losing one’s 
independent monetary policy can induce a substantial cost if the rigidity of 
nominal wages to external adjustments is persistent. The rigidity of nominal 
wages in one country and the relative flexibility of adjustment in nominal 
wages to external shocks in the other country spread asymmetric effects of a 
single monetary policy. In the first country, the recessionary output gap can 
thus incur upward inflation while in the second country the recessionary 
output gap and the adjustment of nominal wages to macroeconomic shocks 
do not overlap excess purchasing power that could produce inflation as is the 
case in the first country. Empirical evidence shows that a single currency area 
yields significant benefits to small and open economies. However, the lack of 
flexibility of market mechanisms and inflexible labor markets lead to 
significant costs of adopting the single currency. 
 
VI. ICELAND’S ECONOMIC RECOVERY: OUTLOOK AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
The financial and economic crisis led to negative economic growth, 
inflationary persistence, high unemployment rate and a deteriorating balance 
of payments. The main question faced by economists and policymakers is the 
outlook of Icelandic economic recovery. The macroeconomic outlook for 
2009 is broadly in line with expectations following the aftermath of the crisis. 
The European Commission recently forecasted 11.6 percent decline in 
economic growth. In 2010, the Commission foresees a rebound of economic 
activity with 1.8 percent annual growth rate. The resurgence of economic 
activity requires a significant amount of flexibility in labor market and the 
real sector. The experience and empirical research have shown that the 
innovation is of significant importance in economic recovery. As picture 16 
shows, the Icelandic economy experienced a robust positive output gap 
between 2003 and 2007 when the output grew above its potential. 
Consequently, the inflation rate slipped out of the central bank’s target range 
and the economy began overheating. In spite of high interest rates, the 
economy had not contracted mostly because the banking sector was 
predominantly outward oriented as its activities were nearly ten times the 
Iceland’s GDP. In the medium term between 2009 and 2011, the Icelandic 
economy is likely to experience a negative output gap. Instead of pumping 
more fiscal funds into the economy, the emphasis on innovation and 
technological progress is one the key drivers in bringing the economic 
growth to its potential. There has been much debate whether expansionary 
fiscal policy can close the output gap. Before the economic crisis occurred, 
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Iceland went through a period of unusually high growth rates when the 
economic activity went above its potential. Thus, the emergence of the crisis 
led to excess aggregate demand over aggregate supply and the result of 
monetary and fiscal expansion resulted in high inflation rate. Given rational 
expectations of firms and households, the continuance of an increased 
government spending could spread an excess purchasing power and result in 
nothing else but persistent inflation over the medium term. Another important 
measure of credibility of economic policy is consumer confidence. In the 
second quarter of 2007, Iceland’s consumer confidence index reached an 
incredible 146.5. Two years later, it fell drastically to 27.2 alongside a 23.8 
percent annual drop in private consumption. Increasing government spending 
as an attempt to boost overall demand is at the huge risk of inflationary 
persistence which is one of the keenest threats to macroeconomic stability. 
 
Graph 15: Output gap in Iceland (1991-2011) 
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Source: Central Bank of Iceland, Economic indicators (2009) 
 
The speed of economic recovery will depend on the ability of 
macroeconomic policymakers to contain inflationary pressures through 
restrictive government spending. As a consequence of the bailout loan 
arrangement at the IMF and foreign indebtedness, Iceland’s public debt grew 
to historic highs. It is one of the harshest threats to economic growth in the 
long run. The financial crisis seriously affected the stock market. Before the 
crisis, equity market capitalization reached 120 percent of the GDP. After the 
crisis, following the collapse of the banking sector, it dropped to 20 percent 
of the GDP. In a long-term perspective, the size of Iceland’s public debt is its 
central threat to a successful economic recovery. The ongoing challenge, 
however, is to reestablish financial stability, implement pro-growth reforms, 
remove barriers to flexibility and capital formation. At last, but not least, the 
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economic policymakers should focus on reversing government spending to 
promote growth, jobs and stable public finances. 
 
Table 5: Macroeconomic Outlook (2009-2014) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Economic growth (in %) -6.79 -3.01 3.02 2.41 1.66 3.10 
Unemployment rate (in %) 8.02 8.64 8.39 6.66 4.68 3.39 
Inflation rate (in %) 12.07 5.95 3.55 2.51 2.50 2.50 
Current account balance (% of the GDP) -6.51 -0.91 2.149 -1.20 -0.66 -0.84 
Fiscal balance (% of the GDP) -7.35 -2.73 0.46 3.93 5.99 5.99 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010) 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The emergence of the financial and economic crisis left economists and 
policymakers wondering about its causes. A vast majority of them blamed 
free-market reforms. In the 1980s, Iceland experienced a rampant inflation 
alongside a turbulent macroeconomic environment. At the beginning of 
1990s, the government of Iceland under the leadership of David Oddsson 
implemented a set of free-market reforms. State-owned companies were 
privatized. Financial markets were liberalized. The central bank was granted 
full independence in taming rampant inflation. In addition, the corporate tax 
rate was cut from 52 percent in 1985 to 15 percent in 2008. When the 
financial crisis eroded the stock market which led to the collapse of the 
banking sector, many economists, analysts and policymakers immediately 
blamed free-market reforms as the foremost origin of the crisis. 
 
However, the empirical evidence and a macroeconomic analysis reverse this 
kind of thinking. The main origin of the financial and economic crisis that 
evolved in Iceland is a failure of monetary policy. In 2002, Iceland witnessed 
a mild recession that ended quickly. Ever since then, the central bank 
constantly failed to meet the inflation target. In response, it raised benchmark 
interest rate to double-digit levels. As a consequence of a stunning gap in 
interest rates, the Icelandic krona strongly appreciated. In such 
circumstances, high domestic interest rates discouraged the domestic banking 
sector from borrowing in domestic currency. With interest rates standing at 
double-digit levels, uncovered interest parity encouraged households, firms 
and banks to borrow in foreign currency. 
 
Iceland’s three major banks - Kaupthing, Glintir and Landsbanki were thus 
expanding their operations and activities abroad through low foreign interest 
rates. In the coming years, the assets and liabilities of these banks grew 
substantially, exceeding the size of the Icelandic economy by roughly ten 
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times. In annual reports, P/E ratios were unusually high given the significant 
amount of the leveraged operations. Hence, the foreign reserves of the central 
bank were far too small for the bank to able to act as a lender of the last 
resort. 
 
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the federal bailout of Bear 
Stearns, the first signals of the serious and deep financial crisis occurred. 
When the performance of OMX Iceland 15 stalled, Iceland’s stock market 
turned into a bubble and when the krona headed towards depreciation, 
investors demanded the withdrawal of the deposits from Icelandic banks. 
With gross external liabilities exceeding 900 percent of Iceland’s GDP, 
Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir were unable to meet those liabilities as 
the net worth of assets encountered a deep loss. 
 
The macroeconomic effects of the financial crisis were significant. In GDP 
terms, Iceland was one of the biggest victims of the crisis. The economic 
growth decreased significantly, inflation peaked up and the unemployment 
rate grew from one of the lowest levels in the industrialized world to one of 
the highest. The stock market was virtually frozen and the government 
decided to impose capital controls. The IMF approved $2.1 billion dollar 
emergency loan as an attempt to restore the banking system. Credit rating 
agencies such as Moody and Fitch downgraded Iceland sovereign debt. In a 
recent report, Bloomberg wrote about Iceland’s concern about junk rating 
prospects given the fact that Fitch has rated Iceland BBB- which is only one 
notch above the junk status. 
 
The Icelandic financial and economic crisis is a nice lesson about the 
consequences of a failed monetary policy. Empirical evidence and research 
suggest that a misguided monetary policy was the main cause of the crisis. It 
should not be neglected that the fiscal cost of the financial crisis is greater in 
small and open economies. Economists and policymakers should learn that 
policy failures cause more adverse effects than market failures. 
 
Iceland’s high public debt is the main obstacle to full economic recovery 
which shall be expected no sooner than in 2012. It would be mistaken to 
believe that Iceland could avoid the financial crisis since the latter was a 
worldwide phenomenon. However, if the central bank of Iceland had 
predicted the inevitable consequences of the unusually robust performance of 
the banking system caused by the central bank itself and led a prudent 
supervision, the crisis would certainly not have been as deep as it was. 
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